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Abstract. We establish the nature of the dynamics of the exchange rate in a two
country model with heterogenous ﬁrms a la Abadir and Talmain (2002).
We are picking an “oﬀ-the-shelf” two country (‘home’ or ‘foreign’) monopolistic com-
petition model from Cook and Devereux (2016), denoted as CD later, and adapt it to our
setting. We generalize their model by allowing heterogenous productivities among ﬁrms,
and heterogeneity in the shares of demand for each commodity. Breaking the homogeneity
of ﬁrms is required for important reasons. First, it is the reality, and it leads to a very dif-
ferent and nonlinear solution of the model. Second, the “representative ﬁrm” assumption
has been shown in our previous work to be far from innocent, as it linearizes the dynamics
of GDP and the other aggregate variables to a process that contradicts the data (loses
the long-memory and turning-point features). We also simplify aspects of the model, as
CD were interested in a very diﬀerent problem: the implication of the zero lower-bound of
interest rates on monetary policy. We assume no disutility of work (i.e., inelastic labour
supply), no capital mobility, and no price friction. The ﬁrst two restrictions and the Calvo
price adjustment (as assumed in CD) simplify the calculations but do not change the spirit
of the model.
The home country [resp. foreign] is inhabited by an inﬁntely lived dynasty withNt [resp.
N∗t ] agents at time t. The home dynasty aims to maximize, at time t, the intertemporal
utility:
Ut = Et
∞
j=0
βj

u1−ρh c
ρ
h,j + u
1−ρ
f c
ρ
f,j
1/ρ
, with Σi=h,f ui = 1, 0 < β, ρ < 1, (1)
where ch,t and cf,t are the consumption of home and foreign goods by the home represen-
tative agent at time t, uh and uf are coeﬃcients of the time-invariant felicity function for
the home agents, the coeﬃcients β and ρ encapsulate time preferences and the degree of
subtituability between the home and foreign commodities, and Et denotes the expectation
operator conditional on the information available at time t. Likewise, the intertemporal
utility for the foreign country is
U∗t = Et
∞
j=0
βj

u∗
1−ρ
h c
∗
ρ
h,j + u
∗
1−ρ
f c
∗
ρ
f,j
1/ρ
, with Σi=h,f u
∗
i = 1, (2)
where c∗h,t and c
∗
f,t are the consumption of their own home and foreign commodities by
the foreign representative agent, and u∗h and u
∗
f are the coeﬃcients of the foreign felicity
function. In both countries, each agent supplies inelastically one unit of labour in each
period, as leisure is absent from the felicity function.
Symmetric felicities: Home and foreign agents share the same felicity function when
uh = u
∗
f and uf = u
∗
h, (3)
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as the home good in the ‘home’ country becomes the foreign good when shipped to the
‘foreign’ country and vice versa.
1.1 Composite commodities bundles and production.
Following CD, production in the home and foreign countries uses labour according to
Yt = θtN
employed
t , and Y
∗
t = θ
∗
tN
employed∗
t ,
where θt and θ
∗
t are the technical eﬃcencies at home and abroad, and N
employed
t and
Nemployed
∗
t are the quantity of labour used at time t. As the supply of labour is inelas-
tically, labour market clearing requires that the demand for labour by the ﬁrm equals the
number of agents in each country:
Nemployedt = Nt and N
employed∗
t = N
∗
t .
We will assume that the technical productivities θt and θ
∗
t follow the process derived
in Abadir and Talmain (2002), henceforth AT, and empirically validated by Abadir et
al. (2013). One could endogenize this assumption by assuming, as in AT, that the home
and foreign commodities are produced by aggregating, according to a CES function, the
output of a large number of monopolistically ﬁrms whose log-productivites follow stable au-
toregressive processes, such as AR(1) with AR coeﬃcients distributed according to a Beta
distribution on the unit interval. The proﬁt of the ﬁrms, Πt and Π
∗
t , are (in their local
currencies)
Πt = Ph,tYt −WtNt and Π
∗
t = P
∗
h,tY
∗
t −W
∗
t N
∗
t ,
where Ph,t and Wt [resp. P
∗
h,t and W
∗
t ] are the price of the home good and the wage in the
home country [resp. foreign country] in their local currencies. The associated unit costs are
unit costt =
Wt
θt
and unit cost∗t =
W ∗t
θ∗t
.
Home and foreign goods are not storable and can only be used for consumption in the
period they are produced, hence market clearance in these markets requires
Yt = Ch,t +C
∗
f,t, and Y
∗
t = C
∗
h,t +Cf,t, (4)
where Ch,t and C
∗
f,t are the aggregate consumpton at home and abroad of the good produced
in the ‘home’ country, and likewise for the foreign produced good:
Ch,t = Ntch,t, C
∗
f,t = N
∗
t c
∗
f,t, Cf,t = Ntcf,t, and C
∗
h,t = N
∗
t c
∗
h,t.
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1.2 Demand for each good.
As in CD, we assume that the law of one price holds for each good:
Pf,t = StP
∗
h,t, and P
∗
f,t =
Ph,t
St
, (5)
where St is the nominal exchange rate (home price of foreign currency). Free trade in
goods is encapsulated in this assumption; however, we assume that factors are immobile.
Hence, the home dynasty cannot transfer income across periods, as it would require capital
mobility, and must optimize the felicity in (1) or (2) subject to current income in every
period. Let the absorptions At and A
∗
t in each country be:
At =

u1−ρh C
ρ
h,t + u
1−ρ
f C
ρ
f,t
1/ρ
, and A∗t =

u∗
1−ρ
h C
∗
ρ
h,t + u
∗
1−ρ
f C
∗
ρ
f,t
1/ρ
.
The aggregate consumptions must satisfy
Ch,t =
λtuh
P
1/(1−ρ)
h,t
At, and C
∗
f,t =
λ∗tu
∗
f
P ∗
1/(1−ρ)
f,t
A∗t , (6)
where λt and λ
∗
t are Lagrange multipliers which satisfy
1
λρt
=
uh
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
h,t
+
uf
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
f,t
, (7)
and likewise for λ∗t . Hence, by the law of one price (5), the aggregate demand for good h is
Dt
Dt = Ch,t +C
∗
f,t =
λtuhAt + λ
∗
tu
∗
fA
∗
tS
1/(1−ρ)
t
P
1/(1−ρ)
h,t
, (8)
and likewise for the foreign aggregate demand.
Pricing. The elasticity of demand ν associated with (8) is
ν ≡
1
1− ρ
. (9)
The associated optimal pricing for each ﬁrm are
Ph,t =
unit costt
ρ
and P ∗h,t =
unit cost∗t
ρ
.
After substitution for the unit cost, the associated product prices are
Ph,t =
Wt
ρθt
and P ∗h,t =
W ∗t
ρθ∗t
, so Pf,t =
StW
∗
t
ρθ∗t
, (10)
P ∗h,t =
W ∗t
ρθ∗t
and P ∗f,t =
Ph,t
St
=
Wt
ρθtSt
. (11)
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Aggregate prices. The aggregate price in the home country Pt is such that the value of
absorption is equal to the aggregate value of its constituants, given from (6)
PtAt = Ph,tCh,t + Pf,tCf,t.
It is related to the Lagrange multiplier from (7)
1
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
t
=
1
λρt
,
which yields the aggregate price:
1
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
t
=
uh
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
h,t
+
uf
P
ρ/(1−ρ)
f,t
.
It can be directly linked to the home aggregate technical eﬃciency θ̟,t by the substituting
for Ph,t and Pf,t from (10):
Pt =
Wt
ρθ̟,t
, with θ
ρ/(1−ρ)
̟,t ≡ uhθ
ρ/(1−ρ)
t + uf

θ∗t
̟t
ρ/(1−ρ)
, (12)
where the eﬀective wage ratio ̟t is
̟t ≡
StW
∗
t
Wt
.
Likewise for the foreign country, the aggregate price P ∗t is related to the foreign aggregate
technical eﬃciency θ∗̟,t
P ∗t =
Wt
ρθ∗̟,tSt
=
W ∗t
ρθ∗̟∗,t
, with

θ∗̟,t
ρ/(1−ρ)
≡ u∗h

θ∗t
̟t
ρ/(1−ρ)
+u∗fθ
ρ/(1−ρ)
t , and θ
∗
̟∗,t ≡ ̟tθ
∗
̟,t.
(13)
Symmetric felicities: In this case, the home aggregate technical eﬃciency is equal to the
foreign one in equilibrium:
u∗h = uf and u
∗
f = uh =⇒ θ̟,t = θ
∗
̟,t.
1.3 Good markets clearing.
In the home goods market, substituting from (12) and (7) into (6), we obtain
Ch,t =

Pt
Ph,t
	1/(1−ρ)
uhAt, and C
∗
f,t =

StP
∗
t
Ph,t
	1/(1−ρ)
u∗fA
∗
t .
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Substituting for the prices from (10) and (12) and (13), we obtain
Ch,t =

θt
θ̟,t
	1/(1−ρ)
uhAt, and C
∗
f,t =

θt
θ∗̟,t
	1/(1−ρ)
u∗fA
∗
t . (14)
Clearing in the home product market requires demand from (8) equals supply from (4)
Dt = Yt
=⇒ θtNt =

θt
θ̟,t
	1/(1−ρ)
uhAt +

θt
θ∗̟,t
	1/(1−ρ)
u∗fA
∗
t
hence market clearing requires
1 = θ
ρ/(1−ρ)
t


uhat
θ
1/(1−ρ)
̟,t
+
u∗fa
∗
tn
∗
t
θ∗̟,t
1/(1−ρ)

, (15)
where
at =
At
Nt
, a∗t =
A∗t
N∗t
and n∗t =
N∗t
Nt
.
Likewise for the foreign good,
C∗h,t =


P ∗t
P ∗h,t
1/(1−ρ)
u∗hA
∗
t , and Cf,t =

Pt
Pf,t
	1/(1−ρ)
ufAt,
which implies
C∗h,t =

θ∗t
θ∗̟,t̟t
	1/(1−ρ)
u∗hA
∗
t , and Cf,t =

θ∗t
θ̟,t̟t
	1/(1−ρ)
ufAt. (16)
Clearing in the foreign product market requires
1 =
[θ∗t ]
ρ/(1−ρ)
̟
1/(1−ρ)
t


u∗ha
∗
t
θ∗̟,t
1/(1−ρ) + ufat/n∗t
θ
1/(1−ρ)
̟,t

. (17)
1.4 Equilibrium per capita world-absorption under symmetric felicities.
In this case the home product market clearing condition (15) becomes
1 =
θ
ρ/(1−ρ)
t uh [at + a
∗
tn
∗
t ]
θ
1/(1−ρ)
̟,t
,
which reduces, using the elasticty of demand ν from (9), to
θ̟,t
θt
	ν
=
uh [at + a
∗
tn
∗
t ]
θt
, (18)
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which link per capita world-absorption, at + a
∗
tn
∗
t , to the parameters of the felicities and
technical eﬃcencies and the exchange rate.
Likewise, (17) becomes
1 =
[θ∗t ]
ν−1
̟νt θ
ν
̟,t
[ufa
∗
t + ufat/n
∗
t ] ,
hence 
θ̟,t
θ∗t
	ν
=
uf [at + a
∗
tn
∗
t ]
̟νt θ
∗
tn
∗
t
. (19)
Dividing (18) by (19), we derive the equilibrium eﬀective wage ratio ̟t in terms of the ratio
of technical eﬃcencies ηt and of the ratio of felicity preferences ψt:
̟t = η
ρ
tψ
1−ρ
t , (20)
where
ηt ≡
θ∗t
θt
and ψt ≡
uf
uhn∗t
. (21)
Also, replacing ̟t from (20) into (12)
θ̟,t
θt
	ρ/(1−ρ)
= uh + uf

ηt
̟t
ρ/(1−ρ)
= uh + uf

ηt
ψt
ρ
. (22)
Replacing for (θ̟,t/θt) from (22) into (18), we obtain the equilibrium value of the per capita
world-absorption
at + a
∗
tn
∗
t = θtu
(1−ρ)/ρ
h

1 + n∗ηρtψ
1−ρ
t
1/ρ
. (23)
1.5 Equilibrium per capita absorption under symmetric felicities.
GDP and CA (current account): at an equilibrium, production is equal to aggregate de-
mand. From (8)
GDPt = PtDt = Ph,tCh,t + P
∗
f,tC
∗
f,t = Ph,t

Ch,t +C
∗
f,t

,
GDP∗t = Pf,t

C∗h,t +Cf,t

,
by the law of one price. The current account CAt is
CAt = GDPt − PtAt
= Ph,tC
∗
f,t − Pf,tCf,t.
In the absence of capital mobility, the current account must be balanced in every period:
Ph,tC
∗
f,t = Pf,tCf,t.
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Per capita absroption: Substituting for prices and consumptions from (10), (11), (16) and
(14) we obtain
Wt
ρθt

θt
θ̟,t
	ν
uhA
∗
t =
StW
∗
t
ρθ∗t

θ∗t
θ̟,t
	ν
ufAt
=⇒ a∗t = [ζt]
2−ρ
1−ρ at, where ζt ≡ η
ρ
tψ
1−ρ
t . (24)
Replacing a∗ in (23),
1 +

η
ρ/(1−ρ)
t ψt
2−ρ
n∗t
	
at = θtu
(1−ρ)/ρ
h

1 +
uf
uh

ηt
ψt
ρ	1/ρ
=⇒ at =
θtu
(1−ρ)/ρ
h [1 + n
∗
t ζt]
1/ρ
1 + n∗t [ζt]
(2−ρ)/(1−ρ)
. (25)
1.6 National Income identity and equilibrium exchange rate under symmetric fe-
licities.
National Income in the home country is the sum of wages and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The per-unit
proﬁt is, from (10),
Ph,t −
Wt
θt
=
1− ρ
ρ
Wt
θt
,
hence the proﬁt margin is (1− ρ) /ρ. Since aggregate wages are NtWt, the aggregate proﬁts
are
Πt =
1− ρ
ρ
NtWt,
and the National Income, NIt, is
NIt = NtWt +Πt =
NtWt
ρ
.
Since the current account is always balanced, absorption is equal to national income
PtAt =
NtWt
ρ
=⇒
Wt
Pt
= ρat. (26)
Likewise in the foreign country
W ∗t
P ∗t
= ρa∗t . (27)
Therefore, recalling (24),
W ∗t Pt
P ∗t Wt
=
a∗t
at
= [ζt]
2−ρ
1−ρ .
Recalling from (20) the value of the eﬀective wage ratio:
̟t =
W ∗t St
Wt
= ζt,
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Hence
W ∗t Pt
P ∗t Wt
=
Pt
StP ∗t
ζt = [ζt]
2−ρ
1−ρ =⇒
StP ∗t
Pt
= ζ
−1/(1−ρ)
t =

θ∗t
θt
	
−ρ/(1−ρ) uhn
∗
t
uf
(28)
by (24) and (21).
2.1 Implication for the dynamics of the exchange rate.
Taking logs,
st = logPt − logP
∗
t +
ρ
1− ρ
(log θt − log θ
∗
t ) + logn
∗
t + log
uh
uf
. (29)
The last term is a constant, and logn∗t = log(N
∗
t /Nt) is a linear time trend if the two
poulations grow at diﬀerent rates but constant otherwise. The auto-correlation function
(ACF) is invariant to such trends and constants when deﬁned with time-varying means, as
in AT and in Abadir et al. (2013),
ρτ ≡ corr (zt, zt−τ ) ≡
cov (zt, zt−τ )
var (zt)var (zt−τ )
, (30)
where cov(zt, zt−τ ) ≡ E[(zt − Ezt) (zt−τ − Ezt−τ )]. Hence, the ACF of st is the same as the
ACF of
logPt − logP
∗
t +
ρ
1− ρ
(log θt − log θ
∗
t ) ; (31)
and we now consider what the ACFs of (log θt − log θ
∗
t ) and (logPt − logP
∗
t ) are, and how
they combine.
The ACF of log θt (and similarly for log θ
∗
t ) has a series expansion. Its leading term was
derived on p.766 of AT and its full representation was obtained in Abadir et al. (2013) as
ρτ ≈
1− a [1− cos (ωτ)]
1 + (bτ)c
(32)
whose Fourier inversion produces a spectrum f(λ) of magnitude proportional to |λ− ω|c−1.
If the average length ω of the business cycle in the two countries is approximately the same,
then the two spectra combine as in Section 4 of Granger (1981) to give the same family of
spectra and therefore the ACF of (log θt − log θ
∗
t ) is (32) again. Finally, if (logPt − logP
∗
t )
has short memory dynamics, then the ACF of the log exchange rate st is dominated by the
productivities’ term (log θt − log θ
∗
t ) and has the form (32). A suﬃcient (but not necessary)
condition for these dynamics to take place is if (logPt − logP ∗t ) is a trend-stationary process:
the price ratio is allowed to diverge along some possibly nonlinear trend, but not stray
uncontrollably away from it. A special case of this arises if (as is the case in developed
countries) the Central Banks try to synchronize the expansion or contraction phases of
their monetary policies.
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